Psychology of Religion

The psychology of religion can be defined as the study of religious behaviour, thoughts and feelings. It also involves the study of religious influences on human behaviour, thoughts and feelings. Since the 1990s, the study of spirituality has been added to the study of religion, as a contemporary phenomenon normally understood to involve people who prefer to define themselves as spiritual but not religious. 

This chapter will overview the development of the psychology of religion by highlighting four features. First, we will examine the stifling influence of the perceived conflict between religion and psychology, and the resulting allegations that religious behaviour, thoughts and feeling would be difficult to study scientifically. Second, we examine the preferred methodologies used in the psychology of religion. Thirdly, we examine the cultural biases in the field. Finally and most importantly, we describe some salient topics, questions and concepts, past and present.  

The psychology of religion started auspiciously enough. The best-known early work is The Varieties of Religious Experience (1902) by the eminent Harvard psychologist-philosopher-physiologist William James. He drew on a range of reputable biographical sources, as well as the pioneering questionnaire-based material of James Starbuck in which a sample of predominantly prosperous white, Protestant Americans described their religious development and experience. James offered descriptions and definitions which still haunt the field today, for example speaking of religion as the relationship of “individual men in their solitude to what they consider the divine”, and writing positively of the religion of the “twice-born” who have struggled with doubt and despair to reach a deeper understanding of life and its existential dilemmas.

Then the readable and persuasive writings of Sigmund Freud began to appear in English translation (e.g. The Future of an Illusion, 1927). Freud had developed psychoanalysis, “the talking cure”. This popular method of relieving psychiatric disorder remained controversial for years, though now in the twenty-first century, its scientific and neuroscientific repute is higher than it ever was in the twentieth century. Freud scandalised religious communities by talking about G-d as an exalted father-figure and religion as a universal neurosis.  Freud advanced some interesting and profound ideas about the foundations of religious feelings. These were often wittily reductionist, and they meshed neatly with a zeitgeist dismissing religion as a primitive prop, unnecessary for the civilised mind. Following Freud’s lead, there were other accusations suggesting that religion had harmful effects on mental health. For example Ellis (1962) accused religion of leading to guilty feelings as a result of sin, resulting in distress and neurosis. 

In parallel with this bad press for the causes and effects of religion, was the development of the behaviourist school of psychology, with its positivist emphasis on observing and recording only what is clearly definable, observable and recordable. It was suggested that religion could not be clearly defined, observed or recorded, and was not an appropriate object for the attention of scientific psychology.  These two unlikely companions – the Freudian and the behaviourist influences – had a powerful effect in giving religion a generally unworthy reputation, and in demoting the study of religion by psychologists

There was a backlash in religious circles. Psychologists were seen - with some justice – as anti-religious. The devout were advised against seeking psychological help, on the grounds that their religious feelings would be dismissed, or misunderstood, or regarded as symptoms of psychological disturbance (see Loewenthal, 2000). Any claims by psychology to scientific or clinical respectability were seen in some religious circles as baseless, as for instance in Miller’s (1984) description of Freud and his cohorts as “charlatans”.

During the early and mid twentieth century there were reputable attempts to involve non-pejorative views of religion in the practice of psychological therapy (notably by Carl Gustav Jung, 1958), and to attain appropriate social-scientific and psychological  understanding of the psychological processes involved in religion (notably by Gordon Allport, 1950). David Wulff’s book provides a fuller view. The incorporation of a sophisticated understanding of religion into the psychological therapies was initiated  particularly strongly by the objects-relations school of psychoanalysts (see Wulff). In parallel, appropriate scientific investigation of religion gained vigour and reputability during the last quarter of the twentieth century, particularly towards the close. But the earlier conflict seemed to dominate thinking for much of the century, and inhibited the development of good work until about the 1970s. Until then, religion was often not indexed in psychology textbooks. When religion did appear, it was usually mentioned in a spuriously pejorative way. Since the 1970s, there has been a decline in the proportion of pejorative references to religion in psychology textbooks, and a very rapid growth in the volume of published work and citations.

Some trends in methods and topics.

The 1970s saw the appearance of two pioneering textbooks in the psychology of religion:  Laurence Brown’s (1973) Psychology and Religion, and Michael Argyle and Benjamin Beit-Hallahmi’s (1975) Social Psychology of Religion. Both sets of authors were able to assemble collections of serious psychological research, reporting empirical investigations of religious behaviour, thoughts and feelings. Over the ensuing decades, further textbooks appeared, including further works by Brown, Argyle and Beit-Hallahmi. During the 1970s through to the 1990s there was probably an over-reliance on questionnaires, surveys and measures of attitudes and personality. Many studies used a basic correlational design, involving the measurement of some aspect of religion and of personality or social attitudes or beliefs, and then examining their associations. Many such studies tackled important problems – such as the nature and correlates of religious experience, whether people of particular temperament or social class or gender or age are likely to be drawn to religion, whether religious activity has a calming effect, and how and when racial prejudice is associated with religious affiliation. 

Until the 1990s, studies in the psychology of religion were not fully exploiting the full range of methodologies.  Although experimental studies were widespread elsewhere in psychology, they were very seldom used to examine religious behaviour. It might have been argued that experimental studies in this field were not ethical or feasible, but at the time of writing, good experimental work is now being initiated.  There were very few prospective studies. From both experiments and prospective studies, it is safer to draw causal inferences than it is from correlational data. For example we might do an experiment in which people are asked to engage in prayer and their mood is examined and compared to the mood of those listening to classical music or playing solitaire. Using this kind of research design, we could be more sure that any differences in mood were due to the effects of prayer, than if we had done a correlational, cross-sectional study assessing mood and correlating it with prayer, music-listening and solitaire-playing habits. Any associations between mood and prayer in the latter study might have been due to the effects of prayer, or might have been because people are more likely to pray when they are in particular moods. The emotional causes and effects of prayer pose a particularly interesting methodological problem, since correlational studies generally show inconclusive results. However it has been claimed that when people are distressed they are more likely to pray, and when things start to improve, they may pray less. Time- and event-dependent effects like these need to be examined in longitudinal (prospective) studies. Correlational, cross-sectional studies will conceal effects. 

During the 1980s and 1990s there was a considerable improvement in the status and methods of qualitative analysis. The development of grounded theory methodology and thematic analysis enabled researchers to engage more fruitfully with interview design, interview material, and material from group discussions, interactions and observations. The ruling positivist ethos gave some ground to phenomenology, and experiential perspectives were awarded some scientific credence. These developments were rapidly taken on board in the study of religious behaviour, thinking and feeling. There has been a school of thought suggesting that qualitative analysis cannot be combined with quantitative methodologies. However most researchers would feel that human psychology is best studied by a flexible approach to research methods,  employing the most appropriate methods or mix of methods for the topics and questions being studied.

By the turn of the century, neuroimaging techniques were being applied to the study of religion, giving an indication that different kinds of religious activity may be associated with distinctive patterns of neural activity. 

This amounts to a radical transition. The last decade has seen a transformation from a field dominated by structured questionnaires and cross-sectional, correlational designs, to a flowering of methodological diversity. This has been accompanied by a general improvement in the status and quality of scientific work on the psychological aspects of religion.

Cultural bias: the psychology of Christianity?

Psychology in general has been a “Western” activity. At the time of writing, although psychology is well-developed in many non-Western countries, the psychology of religion has not percolated to the extent that other, more readily applicable, areas of psychology (e.g. clinical, educational) have done. The principal journals which have focused on the psychology of religion have almost entirely reported work in Christian-dominated cultures, particularly the USA, Western Europe, and to a lesser extent, Canada, Australasia and South Africa. English has been the dominant language, and it has proved difficult for researchers to become known and to communicate with others unless their spoken and written English is fluent. 

A further problem for researchers in some countries, and in some religious traditions, has been social or political pressure to generate research that does not appear to question or reflect badly on religion. This can lead to research and reporting in which the need for apologetics may impair the scientific, clinical and scholarly value of the work. To take a fairly common scenario, familiar to many editing journals in this field Prayer may be used as an intervention among a group of people reporting psychological distress, and statistical analysis may show an overall lowering of distress. However there may be shortcomings in descriptions of the sample, measurement, and analysis that - for instance - indicate reluctance to examine whether any participants were not helped, and what may have been the reasons for this.

In spite of these difficulties, recent years have seen increased quantity of good work on psychological aspects of some other religious traditions and trends. Judaism and Islam are being increasingly studied, as are New Religious Movements, and “spirituality”. Some of this work owes a great deal to impetus provided by work in the sociology of religion – a sub-discipline that has performed much more creditably during the twentieth century than has psychology, in the study of religion. Apart from some work on meditation, the psychological aspects and effects of Hinduism, Buddhism, Jainism, Zoroastrianism and other religious traditions have been very little studied. 

There has been interesting work on religious beliefs in the psychiatric context, among ethnic minority groups living in western societies. Roland Littlewood and Maurice Lipsedge’s Aliens and Alienists (1997) and Simon Dein (e.g. 2000) offer insight into the dilemmas for mental health service carers thrown up by unfamiliar religious practices and beliefs, for example speaking in tongues (glossolalia), or beliefs that unpleasant symptoms are caused by spells or spirit possession. In the past, unfamiliar religious beliefs and practices could sometimes lead to misdiagnosis, but the contemporary impetus towards culturally competent care has led to great improvements in the understanding of the psychological and psychiatric impact of religious beliefs and practices. This is an important area of practical application for the psychology of religion.

Conclusions drawn from work on the psychology of religion must therefore be viewed with caution since it has predominantly been done in Christian cultures.

Salient topics, questions and concepts, past and present.

The remainder of this chapter will be occupied with snapshots of the psychology of religion up until the 1990s, and subsequently. Snapshots are not panoramas, they are static, and they are selective - but hopefully they will give a flavour of activity.

Until about 1990, important focii with continuing influence included:

personality and religion

religious experience

religious development

religion and social attitudes, particularly prejudice. 

Important developments in the 1990s and early 2000s include:

distress, psychopathology and coping 

attachment theory

religious change and development

religiously sanctioned violence

positive psychology

the study of psychological aspects of non-Christian religions

neuroimaging

spirituality.

These then will be our focii.

Focii until 1990

Personality and religion

Are particular personalities attracted to religion, or to particular religious groups? What effects, if any do religious activity and other aspects of religious involvement have on personality?  We can define personality as enduring traits or behavioural dispositions. Personality has been the focus of controversy over its status as a psychological concept. There has also been dispute over the extent to which personality traits are hereditable.

To look empirically at the relations between religion and personality involves focussing on some aspects of personality and excluding others. Prime candidates for inclusion on the research agenda on religion were the dimensions of personality on which Hans Eysenck focussed his attention: neuroticism-stability, and introversion-extraversion, to which a third dimension was added later – psychoticism. Eysenck asserted that these aspects of personality were influenced by genetic factors, were likely to remain fairly stable over the life-span, and had a profound effect on behaviour and attitudes. It is outside our current remit to describe the problems with Eysenckian personality theory and its associated measures, but we will look at Eysenck’s claims about personality and religion, and comment that – problems notwithstanding – the theory and measures still command respect and interest for deployment in empirical work.

Eysenck (1975) suggested that those high on neuroticism and introversion were more readily conditionable, and therefore more likely to be moral and religious. Such individuals were labelled “tender-minded”, and were contrasted with the “tough-minded”, who were high on extraversion and low on neuroticism, less readily-conditionable, less moral, and less religious. Initially the evidence supported Eysenck’s ideas, though one sceptical academic psychologist raised the question “Was Torquemada  tender-minded”?  Then evidence began to emerge that women tended to score higher than men on measures of religion, AND on measures of introversion and neuroticism. Leslie Francis (1993) showed that the association between religion and personality was spurious one, the result of gender differences. If the associations between religion and personality were examined separately for women and for men, the associations disappeared. Of course we are still left with interesting questions about gender differences in religious activity (and in personality), but Eysenck’s original suggestions about religion and personality seemed to have been demolished. However the late arrival in Eysenck’s collection of measures proved an interesting exception – the measure of psychoticism (P). This factor is negatively associated with religiosity. This may be because the measure includes some items that that might be more properly regarded as measures of psychopathy (anti-social behaviour) rather than psychoticism as such. We would indeed expect those who identify themselves as actively religious would be unlikely to say, for instance, that they find it fun to hurt other people. Michael Eysenck (1998) considered that the underlying theme in the measuremeant of P is lack of impulse control. Whatever P is measuring, its inverse association with religiosity has proved robust.

What about other facets of personality and character? Jung’s typology – also featuring introversion, among other facets – has attracted surprisingly limited interest among psychologists of religion, with the exception of the team headed by Leslie Francis. They have developed a psychometrically robust measure of factors identified in the Jungian typology, and are investigating  how different Jungian types vary in their preferences for different kinds of religious activity . For instance  Charlotte Craig, Leslie Francis & Mandy Robbins (2004) studied 299 church leaders in the UK, and found extraverted and feeling types were significantly over-represented among female church leaders, compared to male church leaders. However both male and female church leaders preferred sensing to intuition, and judging to perceiving. Roughly, this means they tended to prefer practical action rather than simply thinking, and thought-out plans to impulsive action.

One important influence of Eysenck has been the development of the list of the so-called Big Five factors personality. There is some debate as to exactly which features of personality belong on this list, but the favoured candidates are: extraversion, neuroticism, agreeableness, conscientiousness, and openness.  Recent work on religion and personality has included some focus on the Big Five, with Raymond Paloutzian, James Richardson & Lewis Rambo’s systematic review (1999) concluding that religious change had no systematic effect on these features of personality. Religious change does affect “mid-level” features of personal organisation, such as attitudes, beliefs and social identity. Vassilis Saroglou (2002) conducted a meta-analysis of religion in relation to the Big Five factors of personality. Agreeableness, conscientiousness and extraversion all emerged as related to religiosity, and openness was related to mature religiosity and to spirituality.

This leaves us with some provisional conclusions about personality and religion. Particularly, that if one accepts the concept of personality as useful, there are probably some features of personality which influence aspects of religious behaviour. This is a provisional, rather weak and probably culture-specific conclusion, and there is scope for more work But there are potential applications, for example in the selection and training of clergy. 

Religious experience

Psychological interest in religious experience dates back to William James. Interest then withered in the first two-thirds of the twentieth century, when scientific psychology was dominated by reductionist, positivist and behaviourist perspectives. Interest revived as these perspectives ceased to be dominant, and as the hippy/counter-culture movements fostered interest in alternative forms of consciousness. New religious movements demonstrated that religious experiences could make religion very marketable, and hence perhaps worth investigating.

A range of interesting work has been conducted, including work on the psychological effects and physiological correlates of meditation. 

The Alister Hardy research unit in Oxford (UK) was formed to focus scientific attention on the human tendency to have religious experiences, whether described as mystical, numinous, spiritual, transcendental, divine or simply religious. Led by Laurence Brown, David Hay and others, the unit has been responsible for collecting reports of religious experiences from very large numbers of people, including children. Among many interesting findings, it has been found that large numbers of people report having had religious experiences in childhood, but were usually diffident about mentioning this to other people, often for fear of being thought mad (Hay & Morisy, 1978). 

In the USA, Ralph Hood has developed a useful measure of mystical experience, which has been used to look at the characteristics of people who are likely to report having had such experiences. For example, mystical experience is more commonly reported by people who are high on intrinsic (“sincere”, un-self-centred) religiosity (Hood, 1973).

Work on religious experience has established workable and reliable methods of reporting, definition and measurement. It has assured that this topic – previously epitomising everything that positivists were scornful about – can be seriously examined by social and psychological investigators.

Religious development

The study of religious development was overshadowed by two figures who could lay claim to being among the best-known psychological thinkers to have an impact not only within psychology, but beyond: Sigmund Freud and Jean Piaget. Freud’s influence extended from within psychology and psychiatry, to history, literary criticism and the arts. Piaget’s influence on cognitive developmental psychology remains profound, as it does within education. Both Freud and Piaget had a somewhat reductionist view of religion, but the profundity of their psychological thinking has nevertheless led to important progress in the understanding of the development of religious feelings and concepts.

Freud suggested that the child internalised a father-figure, as a way of resolving the conflicts of the Oedipal stage of development, in which the young child wishes to possess the mother, but fears paternal retribution in the form of castration, and resolves the dilemma by identifying with the father, thereby gaining paternal approval, and vicarious possession of the mother. This internalised father-figure became overlaid with culturally-carried ideas to become the figure of G-d. There are some important problems with this interesting idea. First, Freud’s account of the internalisation of the father-figure does not apply well to girls. In Freud’s accounts of early childhood conflicts, girls are suggested to internalise a mother-figure, but for Freud, G-d remains an exalted father-figure. Second, Freud’s account of the Oedipal conflict is now regarded with some caution. Particularly, it is now believed that this aspect of his ideas was developed only as a more socially-acceptable and less shocking alternative to his original account of the origins of neurosis, which were seen as the result of trauma, particularly involving child abuse, sexual or otherwise. Child abuse was regarded as implausible by Freud’s contemporaries, but it is now empirically shown to be tragically widespread (Masson, 1984).  Thirdly, the empirical investigations of the hypothesis that there will be resemblance between the image of G-d and the image of the father, did not result in strong support for the idea (Beit-Hallahmi & Argyle, 1975). Nevertheless Freud’s ideas continued to exert considerable influence, for example inspiring further work on the conditions under which the G-d image did resemble the father-image, and work on the clinical importance of psychotherapeutic work on the relationship with G-d and on the G-d image. Ana-Maria Rizzutto (1979) for example pointed out resemblances between recalled early family relationships and the relationship with G-d. For example, a man who said he was never close to his father, and who said he has never experienced closeness to G-d. She suggested that thinking about G-d changed and progressed along with thinking about other social relationships as therapy proceeded. 

Piaget himself thought that the idea of G-d was used as a fall-back way of understanding things when other explanations were missing. G-d was seen by children as an all-powerful unassailable source of authority. For Piaget, the use of G-d by children in trying to understand the world (e.g. G-d makes the clouds move) was not really a sign of cognitive-developmental progress, of movement from concrete, percept-dominated to abstract, formal-operational thinking, and Piaget was not interested in the ways in which religious thinking may change and with cognitive development. However Piaget’s (and to some extent Freud’s) ideas about developmental stages have been very popular and important influences on the work of others, enhancing understanding of the ways in which religious thinking may develop in sophistication from childhood and throughout adulthood. Notably, Lawrence Kohlberg’s theories of moral development, and James Fowler’s Stages of Faith have both acknowledged strong Piagetian influence. A wide range of work on religious development is described in Wulff (1997) and Meadows & Kahoe (1984).     

Religion and social attitudes, particularly prejudice. 

A source of bemusement and indeed embarrassment is the fact that in surveys of social attitudes, the more religious tend to emerge as more prejudiced than those who are less religious. The source of embarrassment is of course that religion is supposed to be about fostering respect and love for fellow-humans. Prejudice – unjustified negative stereotyped beliefs about particular social groups – is clearly not a reflection of respect and love. Gordon Allport (1966) addressed this paradox by proposing two orientations to religion: intrinsic and extrinsic. For the intrinsic individual, religion is a “supreme value in its own right”, transcending self-interest, whereas for the extrinsic individual, religion is “utilitarian: useful for the self in granting safety, social standing, solace”. Empirically, it was suggested that intrinsic religiosity would correlated negatively with prejudice, while extrinsic religiosity would correlate positively. The overall association between religion and prejudice would be the result of the preponderance of extrinsically-oriented individuals. Findings have proved rather more complex than Allport originally suggested. But there remains a persistent and tantalising grain of truth, that more humane and mature styles of religiosity are associated with more temperate and tolerant social attitudes, including lower levels of prejudice. Batson, Schoenrade & Ventis (1993) offer a particularly detailed and interesting review. This review includes qualified support for Allport’s orginal suggestions about intrinsic and extrinsic religiosity and their relations with prejudice. Batson et al indicate how Allport’s suggestions have continued to fire investigations into this important area, propelled recently into heightened topicality by the events of September 2001.

Developments since 1990

Distress, psychopathology and coping 

There has now been wide investigation of ways in which religious practices and beliefs can affect wellbeing, distress and psychopathology. Harold Koenig and his collaborators (e.g. Koenig, McCullough & Larson, 2001) and Loewenthal (2006) offer surveys. Two examples follow.

Kenneth Pargament (1997) and his colleagues, and others, have explored ways in which religion can be used in coping with stress and distress, and the effects of different religious coping methods. The most noteworthy finding is that many forms of religious coping do appear to have detectable and positive effects on well-being, including the reduction of anxiety and depression. However there are some aspects of religious coping which have adverse effects – for example the belief that G-d is angry with the individual. This work includes longitudinal studies, in which the effects of particular factors are followed up after a period of time. This method is considered to allow interpretations which are more robust than cross-sectional correlational research. 

It is important to be aware that religious beliefs and practices can be helpful to those in distress – although they are not panaceas. In the past, there has been evidence that mental health professionals sometimes misdiagnosed people engaged in religious practices as psychiatrically ill, or might claim that such beliefs and practices were harmful. Contemporary trends are for much greater sophistication in the understanding of the different roles played by religious factors in psychiatric illness at the stage of diagnosis. William Hathaway’s edited collection on this topic (2003) deals with some of the advances proposed and made since 2000, when the American Psychiatric Association allowed for greater subtlety in employing religious factors in diagnosis, including the introduction into its Diagnostic and Statistical Manual the possibility of including clinical impairment in any important area of functioning, including the religious. There have been advances in the understanding of the roles played by religious factors in coping with psychiatric illness (see Loewenthal, 2006), and in incorporating religious beliefs into psychological therapies (see Pargament and Tarakeshwar, 2005). These developments highlight the practical and clinical importance of improved professional understanding of the psychological aspects of religion and have formed the focus of many recent professional and academic conferences.

On a somewhat different front, a fascinating question is whether those religions which encourage scrupulosity, also encourage Obsessive Compulsive Disorder (OCD). In this disorder, anxiety is expressed by the uncontrollable repetition of ritual actions or intrusive thoughts, for example excessive repetition of particular prayers, or confession, or religious rituals.  This question has generated significant amounts of research in non-Christian religions, as well as Christianity. Greenberg & Witztum (2001) for example studied orthodox Jews. They consider that religion provides a frame in which OCD can be expressed, but does not encourage the illness itself. This conclusion has so far been broadly supported by other investigators. Christopher Alan Lewis (1999) offered an important systematic review, which concludes that while obsessional personality traits are more likely among the religiously active, clinical OCD is neither more nor less likely.

Attachment theory

Attachment theory has offered some exciting insights into religious development and change. The work of Lee Kirkpatrick and of Pehr Granqvist (among others) has built on previous work emphasising the importance of early relationships in the development of religious feelings and concepts, and has introduced the concepts pioneered by John Bowlby to enable new predictions about the course of religious development. Bowlby noted different attachment styles in the infant caretaker relationship: secure attachment, and varieties of non-secure attachment including anxious and indifferent. Kirkpatrick and Granqvist have published and reviewed a range of studies (e.g. 2004) indicating that where there is secure attachment, religious development is likely to follow the socialisation model, in which the child will model him/her self on the primary caretaker. In such cases, religious identity will usually follow that of the primary caretaker, and religious development is unlikely to show dramatic twists and turns. If attachment is insecure, the individual’s religious development may follow the compensation route, in which G-d becomes a compensatory attachment figure. Religious identity may not necessarily be that of the primary caretaker, and sudden conversion and intense religious feelings are more likely. It remains to be seen whether attachment theory is borne out in non-Christian religious contexts.

Religious change and development

Apart from the attachment theory approach, the study of religious change and development has benefited from improvements in qualitative analysis, including the applications of ethnographic methods and phenomenological understanding to psychological topics, the development of grounded theory methodology, and of thematic analysis. This has enriched the study of religious experience and change: greater weight is now given to experiential perspectives, and to biographical and social contexts.

The shift is particularly apparent in the study of religious conversion, which was at one time seen as a single event or episode in an individual’s life, marking a shift or milestone in the development of identity. Different “types” of conversion might occur, but more than one “conversion” was thought to be unusual. The work of Ruard Ganzevoort (2002), James Day (1993) and others have shown that individual biographies show rich and complex sequences of episodes and phases, with the narrative act having itself a reflexive effect on self-perception and on construction of the past. This approach is one which has enabled a richer study of the nuances of religious disbelief.

Yet another input into the analysis of religious change and development has been provided by the work of Dirk Hutsebaut and Bart Duriez in Belgium (e.g. Duriez & Hutsebaut, 2000). They find the framework offered by Allport and the USA-based researchers who have succeeded him, inadequate to understand prejudice, and its relation to different styles of religious thinking, in the European context. Using ideas from Fowler and others, they identify four styles of belief, each characterised by the presence or absence of transcendence, and of symbolism. They suggest a developmental progression from literal affirmation (orthodoxy), through literal disaffirmation (external critique), relativism (reductive interpretation) to second naivete (restorative interpretation). This interesting scheme allows for variations in styles of disbelief as well as styles of belief, and for a richer understanding of the relationships between prejudice and styles of belief.

Religiously sanctioned violence

On September 11 2001 Islamic terrorists destroyed the twin towers in New York City, and targeted other key buildings in the United States. There was great loss of life. As is normative in religious/sectarian violence, the perpetrators were viewed as martyrs within their own group and by sympathisers.  

These events caused a heightened interest in the effects of religion on behaviour, and on religiously-sanctioned violence, with a spate of seminars, books and developing academic research. At the time of writing, it would seem that while there is still a great deal of work to be done, some preliminary conclusions can be drawn. 

Terrorists (or martyrs, depending on your perspective) are unlikely to be suffering from psychological disturbances. The image of the crazed fundamentalist has not been born out by investigations to date. Although fundamentalism has proved difficult to define, though Ralph Hood, Peter Hill and Paul Williamson (2002) emphasise the importance of the search for meaning in which sacred texts are particularly important as a source of supreme authority, offering a meaning system and a guide to normative behaviour. Psychiatric examination of members of terrorist groups has not indicated an unduly high proportion of individuals with psychiatric disturbance. It is possible that individuals recruited into groups being groomed for religiously-sanctioned violence are high on both intrinsic and extrinsic religiosity. Allport implied that individuals with this profile of religious motivation might be fanatical, but there has been no investigation of this possibility. However some investigation has indicated that several social-psychological factors are important, particularly: the salience of identity as a member of a group seen as unjustly served, charismatic leadership delivering rhetoric which nurtures the perception that violent means are appropriate, right, and religiously-justified (see Sarah Savage, 2006, also Brooke Rogers, Kate Loewenthal, Chris Lewis, Richard Amlot, Marco Cinnirella & Humayun Ansari, 2007, offer a review)

Positive psychology

Positive psychology is a generic term for an approach to general and clinical psychology which involves focusing on positive emotions and the cognitions that can give rise to them – as opposed to focussing on negative feelings and clinical symptoms. Seligman (2002) has argued vigorously for this approach to clinical practice, and he and his colleagues have been careful to ensure that an evidence base is being generated.  Positive psychology suggests that individuals need to identify and practice their particular strengths (such as honesty, kindness, or purpose), and emphasises processes and feelings such as hope, honesty, gratitude, spirituality, forgiveness and kindness. Readers will readily appreciate that this involves many virtues traditionally advocated in all major religious traditions, and it would be expected that there would be scope for fruitful dialogue between religious traditions and positive psychology practitioners. Joseph, Linley & Maltby (2006) offer some discussions and reviews.  For example, religious traditions might offer sources of useful strategies for enhancing virtues, while psychologists might offer insights as to which strategies might be most effective.

There are some important antecedents to current positive psychology, whose influence has already been felt in the psychology of religion. Erik Erikson’s Childhood and Society (1963) offers an account of psychosocial development which involves virtues as outcomes of the successful negotiation of developmental crises. This is in contrast to other psychodynamic accounts of development, in which the implicit focus is on the origins of psychopathology.  Victor Frankel (1986) has eloquently described noogenic neurosis - lack of purpose and meaning in life – as a pervasive, indeed normative condition in western society. Frankel argues that this condition needs to be addressed in therapy, and an important task for the therapist is to enable the client to discover his/her purpose in life. Paloutzian (1981) describes how the Purpose in Life test has been used to examine the impact of religious change. Religious conversion boosts the sense of purpose in life, although this surge is not maintained at peak level in the longer term.

The study of psychological aspects of non-Christian religions

Prior to 1990, psychologists had focussed almost exclusively on religious belief , and occasionally disbelief, in the Christian context. There was some interest in the effects of meditation, particularly in the techniques developed in the Buddhist tradition. There were also spasmodic attempts to extend research findings into other religious groups, usually using the traditional research methods of questionnaire measures of personality and social attitudes. These attempts continue to be extended and developed in non-Christian contexts – Jewish and Muslim groups seem to be favoured (Loewenthal, 2000 offers some examples).

It is an open question whether measures of personality, social attitudes and religious beliefs developed for use in Christian contexts are appropriate in non-Christian contests, even when carefully translated and back-translated. Some researchers would wish to see far more qualitative research undertaken, in which the world-views and construct systems of non-Christian cultures can be sensitively explored. This would lay the groundwork for more thoughtful exploration of the psychology of religion in non-Christian cultures.

It should be mentioned that there is a school of thought that suggests there are distinctively religious ways of thinking that are culturally universal. The cognitive science of religion aims to integrate psychological and anthropological research, together with work from other disciplines, to deepen the understanding of cognitive processes involved in religion. Jensine Andresen’s (2001) book offers a useful collection of articles in this area.

Neuroimaging

The advent of neuroimaging has enabled greater precision in identifying the neural pathways active when different psychological functions are carried out, and has given impetus to the search for distinctive patterns of neural activity associated with particular kinds of religious activity.

This development had been preceded in earlier decades by other psychophysiological work, particularly focussing on the physiological changes accompanying meditation This early work involved recording EEGs (electroencephalograms, electrical activity in the neural pathways adjacent to the recording electrodes), ECGs (electrocardiograms, electrical activity in the heart tissues) and GSR (galvanic skin reaction – changes in the electrical conductivity of the skin, the result of increasing perspiration, associated with hormonal changes involved in emotional arousal) (Brown, 1973). Although there were claims that meditation was accompanied by distinctive patterns of electrical al activity in the brain, and other physiological changes, all these measurements were regarded as cruder than the images of blood flow changes in the cortex associated with different kinds of mental activity. So, since the advent of fMRI (functional magnetic resonance imaging), the neuroscientific study of religious activity has been invigorated. For instance Nina Azari, John Missimer and Rudiger Seitz (2005) compared neuroimaging data for religious experience and for happy emotions. There were distinctive patterns for each, and the neural pathways activated in religious experience suggested that social-relational cognition was involved in religious experience.

Spirituality

The turn of the millennium saw increased momentum to distinguish spirituality from religion. Religion was seen as a corollary of institutionalised religion, involving social mores, group phenomena, ritual and dogma. Spirituality was seen as an individual awareness of alternative reality, something that could be experienced outside organised religion. For example David Tacey (2004) argues that the spiritual life “is no longer restricted to those who belong to religious traditions” 

These stereotypes are of course highly debatable, but whatever ones views, it has become clear that spirituality has achieved the status of a phenomenon to be considered alongside or even instead of religion. Credence has been given to the status of those who claim to be spiritual but not religious.  It is noteworthy that one of the latest textbooks in the field, by Ray Paloutzian and Crystal Park (2005) is entitled not “The Psychology of Religion” as is customary, but “ International Journal for the Psychology of Religion, 14, 223-250.