Religion and Altruism

Religious traditions normatively prescribe caring for others as one of the central platforms of religious teaching. Initial research however gave a rather unclear picture of the relations between religion and altruism. It remains a leading-edge question in social science: ‘Are religious people nicer people?’ (Duriez, 2004). We will attempt to explore the relations between religion and altruism using three sources. First we will examine religious teachings and prescriptions about altruism. Second, we will examine social-scientific definitions and explanations of altruism and altruistic behaviour. Finally we will examine the research evidence on the relations between religion and altruism, and attempt to draw conclusions about these relations.

What is religion, and what is altruism?  We will take as a preliminary working definition of religion as a set of (complex) systems of shared beliefs and behaviours about spiritual reality, God, morality, and purpose, with methods for communicating and endorsing these (Loewenthal, 2000: 3). The further complexities of the definition and measurement of religion are outside the scope of this article. For altruism, we will take as a starting point Comte’s (1975) view of altruism as unselfish regard for the welfare of others. Later, we will explore some refinements of this definition. 

Religious teachings, prescriptions and beliefs about altruism

‘Love your neighbour as yourself’ (Leviticus 19:18) has been a core teaching of Judeo-Christian religious traditions, expressed in varying forms. We will examine a selection of teachings and beliefs in different religious traditions, and some social scientific views and findings.

Is altruism a religious value in itself, or simply a means to ultimate reward and punishment? For instance religion has been always concerned with soteriology: ‘what shall we do to be saved?’  The meanings of salvation differ from one religion to another, and so do the ways of attaining it.  Altruistic acts of religious people may be motivated by the quest for salvation. Weber notes:

‘a quest for salvation in any religious group had the strongest chance of exerting practical influences when there has arisen, out of religious motivations, a systematization of practical conduct resulting from an orientation to certain integral values’ (1978: 528). 

If the ministry of Jesus was a paradigm of altruism, his death, as interpreted by his followers, was its ultimate manifestation. For Christians, Novak (1992: 9) states that ‘Jesus is the altruistic man who died for others as he had lived for them’. ‘Agape’ or ‘love’ is usually used instead of ‘altruism’ in Christianity.  Browning (1992: 422) remarks ‘Agape, the Greek word most often used to refer to the rule or law of love in the New Testament, is defined in many Protestant sources as entailing primarily impartial, self-sacrificial action on behalf of the other and without regard to oneself’. However, only ‘the religious virtuosi’ can achieve the extreme self-sacrificial demands of the Christian concept of love that exclude all self-regarding motives. Weber (1978: 539) remarks ‘not everyone possesses the charisma that makes possible the continuous maintenance in everyday life of the distinctive religious mood which assures the lasting certainty of grace’. The extreme self-sacrificial demands of the Christian concept of love may be too hard for ‘the average person’ to practice. Consequently, as Browning (1991: 423) points out, in stark contrast to the initial goals, extreme self-sacrificial demands may fail to extend natural kin altruism to the wider community, or rather function to diminish wider altruism.  Nevertheless, for at least some, ‘salvation may be viewed as the distinctive gift of active ethical behavior performed in the awareness that God directs this behavior, i.e., that the actor is an instrument of God’ (Weber, 1978: 541). Weber calls this type of attitude ‘ascetic’.

In the Jewish tradition, the practice of altruism is regarded as potentially achievable by all. Charitable activity may be practiced in a habitual manner, and this can accord with natural kindly inclination. This is spiritually valuable, and achieves cosmologically beneficial effects. But self-sacrifice, involving efforts directed to the overcoming natural habit and inclination, is a universal potential and can achieve more permanently beneficial effects (Shneur Zalman of Liadi, 1973:236) 

In the case of Buddhism, the doctrine of karma may relate to altruistic beliefs and practices. The doctrine of karma is the most complete formal solution of the problem of theodicy. Weber presents the doctrine of karma as follows:

‘This world is viewed as completely connected and self-contained cosmos of ethical retribution. Guilt and merit within this world are unfailingly compensated by fate in the successive lives of the soul, which may be reincarnated innumerable times in animal, human, or even divine forms. Ethical merits in this life can make possible rebirth into life in heaven, but that life can last only until one’s credit balance of merits has been completely used up. The finiteness of earthly life is the consequence of the finiteness of good or evil deeds in the previous life of a particular soul. What may appear from the viewpoint of retribution as unjust suffering in the present life of a person should be regarded as atonement for sin in a previous existence. Each individual forges his own destiny exclusively, and in the strictest sense of the world’ (Weber, 1978: 524-5).

Inaba’s (2004) work examined the meanings and constructions placed on altruism by individual Christians and Buddhists.  Christians’ altruistic activities aimed to help people not so much in practical ways as in spiritual ways. Altruism is to exalt people other than themselves and to seek the welfare of others rather than their own. When they talked about altruism, some Christians referred to reward. They believed that God will reward their altruistic acts – but their altruistic deeds towards others are ultimately directed to God. Buddhists pointed out that it is more important to give what others need rather than what one thinks they should have. For them, however, altruism is not solely oriented towards other people: altruism is seen as both personally rewarding as well as helpful for other people. It is emphasised that people who perform altruistic activities should also take their own spiritual and material well-being into account.

It can be seen that the practice of helpful and altruistic behaviour has been endorsed and encouraged in a range of religious traditions, as one very important aspect of the practice of goodness. There is some distinction made between more natural forms of helpfulness – such as kin altruism – and truly disinterested and self-sacrifical altruism. The latter may not be achieved by all, but there is some indication that it is an ideal to be emulated and attempted. The practice of goodness has been linked to other important features of religious teachings – notably existential purpose, soteriology and theodicy. 

This elaborate intellectual system varies in some details between religious traditions, and indeed between denominations, cultures and individuals. Nevertheless common features can be seen. Altruistic acts may be motivated by a single factor – the hope of salvation, for example - and/or are part of a system in which concern and care for others are embedded in a network of beliefs about spirituality and purpose in life.

Social-scientific definitions and explanations of altruism.

As mentioned, Comte used altruism to denote the unselfish regard for the welfare of others, or a devotion to the interests of others as an action-guiding principle.The term ‘altruism’ was coined by Comte (1798-1857), and came into the English language in 1853 in translation.  The original French term ‘altruisme’ was suggested by the French legal phrase ‘le bien d’autrui’ (the good of others), and was formed from the Italian equivalent, ‘altrui’, itself a derivative of the Latin ‘alter’ or ‘other.’  Altruism is precisely ‘other-ism’: the effort or actual ability to act in the interest of others (Novak, 1992: 2). Comte (1875) considered that within the individual there were two distinct motives: one was egoistic and the other was altruistic.  Comte acknowledged that human beings had self-serving motives even if they were helping others, and called the motivation to seek self-benefit ‘egoism’.  On the other hand, there are some kinds of social behaviour that come from an unselfish desire to help others, and Comte called this type of motivation ‘altruism’.  Since Comte’s proposals, altruism has been an analytical concept in the social sciences.  

It is important to bear in mind that the term ‘altruism’, as Novak (1992: 3) notes, has the advantage of not being rooted in a specific religious linguistic tradition and serves as a general term that captures an important family resemblance among the world’s diverse ethical vocabularies.

Turning to subsequent social-scientific attempts to understand altruism, these attempts have been clearly influenced by the question whether pure selflessness is possible, and whether and when helpfulness can go further than ‘natural’ kin and own-group helpfulness. In parallel, there have been related efforts to identify the factors that motivate helpful and altruistic behaviour. What factors might motivate altruism?

Apart from external forces such as increased status, social desirability or social approval, it has also been pointed out that feelings of guilt can motivate altruism and that feelings of guilt seek compensation that can be achieved through altruistic acts (Carlsmith & Gross, 1968: Regan et al., 1972).  If altruism is, however, defined as the willingness to help others without normative obligation and without expecting benefits at a later time, we could rarely find actions altruistically motivated.  Macaulay & Berkowitz (1970, 3) defined altruism as ‘behavior carried out to benefit another without anticipation of rewards from external sources.’ Regarding this definition, Rushton & Sorrentino noted:

‘[this definition] includes both the altruist’s intentions and his or her behaviour.  It does, however, exclude such rewards from internal sources as self esteem, self praise for one’s action and relief from empathetic distress, alleviation of feelings of guilt.  Such an exclusion has the practical advantage of avoiding both unobservable variables as well as the philosophical issue of whether there can ever be a truly unselfish act’ (1981, 426).

Rushton’s view is that ‘the primary focus of research attention should be on altruistic behavior, and that postulated motivators such ‘empathy’ and ‘norms of social responsibility’ are hypothetical constructs, to be added only if they can account for the behavioral regularities more thoroughly.’ (Rushton & Sorrentino, 1981, 427).  Moreover, Montada & Bierhoff (1991, 18) defined altruism as ‘behaviour that aims at a termination or reduction of an emergency, a neediness, or disadvantage of others and that primarily does not aim at the fulfillment of own interests,’ adding that ‘the behaviour has to be carried out voluntarily’.  This behavioural definition by Montada & Bierhoff may be most appropriate for the social-scientific understanding of altruism.

Rushton & Sorrentino (1981) provide an historical perspective on altruism.  They argue that there have been three main views on altruism.  The first is that humans are innately evil or bad (e.g. selfish, sinful, aggressive and non-social), and that socialisation is required to make them social and altruistic.  According to Rushton & Sorrentino (ibid.), many writers of the Bible, the Sophists (5th and 4th Century B.C.), the Chinese Confucian philosopher Xun Zi (3rd Century B.C.), Machiavelli (1469-1527), Hobbes (1588-1679) and Freud (1856-1939) held this first view.  The second view is that humans are basically good and that they can be improved or perverted by social conditions.  Socrates (5th Century B.C.), the Chinese Confucian philosopher Meng Zi (4th century B.C.), Aristotle (384-322 B.C.), Rousseau (1712-1778), Maslow (1908-1970) and Rogers (1902-1987) held this view (ibid.).  The third is that humans are neutral: basically neither good nor bad.  Plato (427-374 B.C.), Epicurus (341-270 B.C.), Locke (1632-1704), Marx (1818-1883), Watson (1878-1958) and Skinner (1904-1990) held this third view.

Whether altruism is innate or acquired is another issue.  Allport (1897-1967), Kohlberg (1927-1987) and Rushton (1980: 10) provided abundant evidence in support of the theory that altruism can be learned and developed by social learning.  On the other hand, Novak (1992: 28-32) points out three obstacles to the development of altruism.  First, the neural factor: significant moral progress is difficult or impossible because of the structure of the human brain.  A second obstacle to altruistic transformation is psychological.  Each human being born into this world wishes to be a unique centre of importance and value.  The very behaviour, dispositions and attitudes that help people emerge from childhood as relatively autonomous individuals become to some extent psychological barriers to the emergence of altruism. The human being’s natural quest for selfhood creates psychological habit patterns which are difficult to alter.  A third obstacle is the sociological or social.  The social groupings to which people belong implicitly reinforce an ingrown and out-group mentality which at best sets limits on the growth of altruism and at worst is antithetical to it.  However, Krebs & Hesteren (1992) contend that individuals normally acquire the capacity to perform increasingly adequate types of altruism as they develop, and that individual differences in altruism stem from the interaction between the stage of their development and the opportunities and demands of the social contexts they create and encounter.

The proposed link between empathy and altruism has been carefully examined. Empathy means identifying and feeling sympathy for another person.  Sympathy is a similar concept but carries connotations of being on someone’s side.  People can empathise with their enemies – but may not sympathise.  There is an abundant literature on ‘the empathy-altruism hypothesis’ emphasising that sympathy or empathy for the needy is the motive for altruistic activities.  One feels sorry for homeless people or people in need and wishes to reduce their distress.  Some people feel compassion for those people who are suffering and they reach out to those suffering people.  On the other hand, some feel empathetic distress themselves when they feel sorry for those who are suffering.  Their distress arises from the unpleasant emotions which they feel as a result of seeing the homeless people or people in need.  Alternatively, their distress may arise from emotions of guilt or shame they anticipate if they do not help.  In any case, they feel sorry for people in need and carry out acts to help them.  Their actual altruistic acts also relieve themselves from their own empathetic distress (Inaba, 2004).

It has also been suggested that rational choice underlies altruism. According to Schmidtz (1995), rational choice consists of maximising one’s utility subject to a budget constraint. In recent times theorists have taken the term ‘utility’ to mean something related to or identical to preference satisfaction.  In some cases there are reasons to embrace and nurture one’s concern for others, and the reasons have to do with what is conducive to one’s utility.  It is rational to be peaceful and productive in order to create a secure place for oneself in society, which requires one to have a regard for the interests of others.  People have self-regarding reasons to internalise other-regarding concerns.  On the other hand, one seeks not only to earn the respect and concern of others but also to earn one’s own respect and concern.  Moreover, a person of principles inspires more respect than a person driven by mere expedience (Schmidtz, 1995: 110).

Related to the rational-choice explanation of altruism, has been the link between altruism and positive emotional states. Not only are happier people are more likely to be charitable, true or ‘authentic’,  happiness has been suggested as a consequence of altruistic behaviour (Seligman, 2002; Joseph et al, 2006).  Wuthnow (1995: 67) points out that individual happiness and the good of others are not incompatible but are in fact linked.  In his survey (Wuthnow, 1991), many people reported that helping others made them feel good and was a good way of gaining a sense of satisfaction and fulfilment for themselves.  Gaining fulfilment for themselves and feeling good can be considered as compensation for the time and energy invested. Some religious people regard altruism as giving from a purer part of themselves to something bigger.  Schmidtz (1995: 112) regards this kind of attitude as rational: ‘we give ourselves more to live for by becoming important parts of something bigger than ourselves. A principled character lets us pursue this wider integration without losing our own identity’.

Some people’s motivations for altruism may involve rational choice in the sense that they calculate the benefits they will receive later.  However, we have seen much to indicate that calculation of benefit is not inevitably a primary objective of altruism.

Sorokin’s early work on the positive aspects of human nature identifies altruism as an important feature. Noting that in the early 20th century the social sciences cultivated disciplines for the study of negative aspects of humanity, such as crime and insanity, Sorokin (1889-1968) pointed out that ‘Western social science has paid scant attention to positive types of human beings’ (1950: 4).  Sorokin carried out sociological studies of good neighbours and Christian saints focusing on the characteristics of altruistic persons and how people become altruistic.  He found that most of those in this category professed to be religious in some sense; the majority were female, and there seemed to be no relationship between intelligence and altruism.  Self reports concerning the motivation of altruism showed factors such as parental training, life experience, religion and education to be particularly relevant (Sorokin, 1950).  Since his research, positive aspects of human nature, such as altruism, have been increasingly taken as the subject of further inquiry in social sciences (Seligman, 2002; Joseph et al, 2006). We have seen that the social-scientific understanding of altruism has been dominated by the testing of motivational explanations of altruism, with underlying questions about true selflessness.

Religion has been a theme quite prevalent in the literature on altruism. We now turn to the examination of altruism in relation to religion, and particularly the question whether religion fosters altruism. 

The relations between religion and altruism: empirical evidence and interpretations.

There has been a considerable research into the correlation between altruism and religion. Research into altruism has usually considered questions such as ‘why and under what conditions people sacrifice their lives for the sake of others,’ ‘when and under what conditions people reach out to help somebody in need or distress,’ and ‘under which conditions a person is more likely or less likely to help others.’  

In studying altruism, a range of techniques have been used, experimental and observational methods, questionnaires and psychometric measures, and interviews. All have advantages and disadvantages, but together help to develop understanding of altruism in relation to religion. In recent years, improvement in the qualitative analysis of interview material and other discourse has entailed a decreased reliance solely on survey and questionnaire material, and has improved understanding and interpretation of the research material available. 

Early research on religion and altruism showed unclear relations between religion and altruism. There were some findings that religion related positively to altruistic behaviour.  In 1973, the American Institute of Public Opinion conducted a survey of 1502 respondents, which included the question, ‘How often do you feel that you follow your religious beliefs and take concrete action on behalf of others?’  This survey showed that church attendees perceived themselves as more helpful towards others than non-church attendees (Langford, 1974).  A study by Nelson & Dynes (1976) in southwestern USA eight months after a city had been struck by a damaging tornado studied men’s helping behaviour following the tornado. The researchers assessed a number of indices of religiosity: self-rated religious devotion, frequency of private prayer, and of church attendance, and importance of prayer. Helping behaviour related to the aftermath of the tornado studied was: giving money and/or goods to tornado victims, and performing voluntary disaster relief services. “Routine” helping behaviour, unrelated to the disaster, was also assessed, such as picking up hitchhikers, doing voluntary work, and contributing money or goods to social welfare agencies. Both types of helping – post-disaster, and routine – were positively related to all the indices of religiosity.

On the other hand, some research showed religiosity as unrelated to offering help to others. Cline & Richards (1965) conducted a survey in the Salt Lake area in the USA and found no relationship between the religiosity factors (as measured by frequency of church attendance, frequency of prayer, and contribution of money) and such variables as ‘having love and compassion for one’s fellow man’, and ‘being a Good Samaritan’.  In another study, no relationship was found between religiosity and volunteering to help people (Smith et al. 1975). Moreover, Rokeach (1969) noted that those who rated high on church attendance were more likely to be insensitive and unconcerned for disadvantaged groups.

One explanation for such disparity in the results of the studies in the 1960s and the 1970s is that altruistic behaviour at that time might have been be so much a part of organised religion, and organized religion so normative in society, that respondents failed to answer self-report inventories honestly.  On the other hand, religious people might be more likely to answer questionnaires with honesty, because of their belief that ‘a Supreme Being knows people’s thoughts and acts in all situations.’  Methodological problems such as the measurement of altruism, the measurement of religiosity, and the amount of respondent diversity might contribute to the mixed results.

Since the 1980s, various studies have indicated more clearly that religion promotes altruism.  An analysis based on findings from a questionnaire survey of 300 undergraduate students in the USA indicated that religious persons were more likely to carry out altruistic acts (Zook, 1982). Lynn & Smith (1991) reported that those who did voluntary work in the UK gave religion as one of the main reasons for their participation.

A study by Yablo (1990) contrasted native-born Thai and the USA citizens on the relation between religion and altruistic behaviour. The results showed that the people in Thailand, where 95% of the population is Buddhist, displayed a stronger orientation towards altruistic behaviour than US citizens. Interview results revealed qualitative differences in philosophies and rationale regarding altruistic behaviour. The Thai interviewees were influenced by Buddhist doctrine, while the USA interviewees reported being less influenced by religion and more influenced by pragmatic considerations. The findings of this study suggest a relationship between cultural and/or religious values and altruistic behaviour.

Research by Perkins (1992) examined the relationship between Judeo-Christian religiosity and humanitarianism. The study was based on data collected during 1978-1979 at five diverse colleges and universities in England and the USA, and data collected during 1988-1990 at the same institutions. This study shows that religiosity was most salient in directly promoting humanitarian compassion, and that the influence of other socio-demographic factors failed to attain any level of significance among these student data. Perkins concludes ‘these data suggest that the nature of one’s religious commitment might remain one of the few important influences on humanitarianism for young persons in the college setting cross-nationally (1992: 359)’.

Regarding the contribution of religion to voluntary work, Wilson & Janoski (1995) analysed the data derived from the three-wave Youth-Parent Socialization panel study by the University of Michigan. The results indicate that the relation between religion and voluntary work is complex, and that there should be caution in generalising about the connection. However with regard American giving to charitable organisations, Regnerus et al (1998) found an association with religiosity by analysing the data from the 1996 Religious Identity and Influence Survey. The 13 per cent of the American population which considered itself non religious gave less money to charitable organisations than did the rest of the population which held religious beliefs. Moreover, the results showed that ‘which religious tradition a person professes and practices is less important than the fact that they practice one’ (Regnerus et al., 1998: 490).

Analysing various surveys such as British Social Attitudes, the Gallup Poll, and the British Household Panel Survey, Gill concludes that

‘…there is a great deal of evidence showing that churchgoers are relatively, yet significantly, different from nonchurchgoers.  On average they have higher levels of Christian belief (which is hardly surprising), but, in addition, they usually have a stronger sense of moral and civic order and tend to be significantly more altruistic than nonchurchgoers’. (1999: 261).

Other research has examined the processes and factors involved in altruistic behaviour, and linking it to religion. Through interviews with young people involved in community service, as well as data from national surveys in the United States, Wuthnow (1995) contends that caring is not innate, but learned, in part from the spontaneous warmth of family life, and in part from finding the right kind of volunteer work. He also argues that the best environment to nurture the helping impulse is the religious setting.

Recent work has examined altruism in the context of new religious movements. (Inaba, 2004; Neusner & Chilton, 2005; Habito & Inaba, 2006). For example, Inaba (2004) reported a study of Buddhist and Christian new religions involving interview, participant observation and questionnaires. Altruism was developed not so much (or not primarily) by studying teachings as by relationships between members in the two new religions.  The two religions changed members’ attitudes positively towards altruism through the combination of relationships between members, ethical teachings and practices.

Three factors, namely, teachings and practices, role models, and socialisation in religions, seem to be significant factors in the development of altruism.   People may mention religious practice such as prayer and meditation when they talk about the underlying reasons for development of their altruism.   Others may claim that religious teachings promote their altruism (Inaba, 2004). Love is one of the core teachings of Judaism and Christianity. The love commandments, ‘You shall love the Lord your God with all your heart, with all your soul, and with all your mind (Deuteronomy 6:5) ‘You shall love your neighbor as yourself’(Leviticus 19:18) are seen as central. There are variations on the theme of these love commandment in the New Testament (for example Matthew. 19: 19, 22: 39; Mark 12:31, 12: 33; Luke 10: 27 ).  Altruism stems not only from these teachings, but from practical examples set by religious role models. In Wuthnow’s research on caring (1995), many regarded Mother Teresa as the most compassionate person in the world, although a few admitted that they could not relate to her because she was celibate or too dedicated.  For others, role models are close at hand in religious communities.

In Buddhism, some Buddhists cultivate their altruism through meditation practice. Meditation may give some sort of peacefulness, enabling or leading to greater altruism.  Other Buddhists may mention religious teachings when they talk about their altruism. In Buddhist texts, there is an emphasis on four states of mind: ‘metta’ (loving kindness: bringing joy and happiness to others), ‘karuna’ (compassion: relieving the suffering of others), ‘mudita’ (joy at the joy of others), and ‘upekkha’ (equanimity). ‘Metta’ and ‘karuna’ are comparable to ‘agape’ in Christianity.

Newcomers start to form friendships within their religious communities. In the socialization of religious converts, some may experience tension and anxieties in accepting rules and participating in activities in their new religious life. However, because of involvement in the practices and activities of their religious communities, they have greater opportunities for sharing their problems and interacting with one another and may thus find the support, stability and security. In such circumstances, relationships based on the same faith may result in greater altruism.

In his pioneering qualitative study of religious change, Starbuck suggested that the process of religious conversion and change initiated a more altruistic and selfless perspective. Starbuck (1899: 49- 51) gave eight categories for the motives and forces leading to conversion: (1) fear of death or hell, (2) other self-regarding motives, (3) altruistic motives, (4) following out a moral ideal, (5) remorse and conviction for sin, (6) response to teaching, (7) example and imitation, and (8) urging and other forms of social pressure. The representative instances given by Starbuck to the category of altruistic motives are ‘I wanted to exert the right influence over my pupils at school’, ‘I felt I must be better and do more good in the world’, and ‘It was love for God who had done so much for me’ (ibid.: 50). The findings of his survey are notable. Starbuck wrote:

‘Only 5 per cent are altruistic motives; and if we select from these the ones who mention love of God or Christ as leading them to a higher life, we find only 2 per cent. This is significant in view of the fact that love of God is a point of great emphasis in Christian ethics. It is of interest to compare fear of hell and conviction for sin, which are prominent, with hope of heaven and love of Christ and God, which are almost absent’ (ibid.: 53).

By contrast, with regard to the new life after conversions, Starbuck (ibid.: 126) stated that ‘there is clearly bound up in the process a self-forgetfulness, a sympathetic outgoing which apparently exactly contradicts the exaltation of self.’ Starbuck  ibid.: 127) offers instances of what the respondents said:

‘I was no longer self-centred. The change was not complete, but there was a deep undercurrent of unselfishness’.

‘The change made me very affectionate, while before I was cold to my parents’.

‘My motive to chase worldly riches was changed to that of saving others’.
 

   Starbuck concluded (ibid.: 128) that in a number of cases ‘an immediate result of conversion is to call the person out from himself into active sympathy with the world outside.’ Starbuck went on to argue that the outcrops of self-appreciation and of altruism were two aspects of the same thing:

‘The heightened worth of self and the altruistic impulses in conversion are closely bound up together, and the differences between them lie simply in the different content of consciousness, determined by the direction in which it is turned. The central fact underlying both is the formation of a new ego, a fresh point of reference for mental states. . . . in conversion the element which is most fundamental from the standpoint of priority is the wakening of self-consciousness, while the essential factor from the standpoint of development is the process of unselfing’ (ibid.: 129, 130).

Thus, Starbuck thought that in conversion the most fundamental aspect was the awakening of self-consciousness and that the essential factor from the standpoint of development was the process of ‘unselfing’.

Other work on religion and altruism has examined the possibility that the altruistic and helpful behaviour reported and observed in religious people is the result of social desirability effects, the wish to ‘seem good’ (e.g. Darley & Batson, 1973; Loewenthal, 2000; Duriez, 2004; Saroglou et al, 2005; Pichon et al, 2006). Careful survey and experimental work has established that altruistic and helping behaviour is likely to be an intrinsic aspect of (social) identity among religious people. For example in a Belgian study, Pichon et al found that religious concepts acted at the unconscious level (i.e. after brief exposures too short for conscious recognition) to activate prosocial behavioural schemas. Thus social desirability does not adequately explain the links between religion and prosocial and altruistic behaviour. 

In this section, we have examined work indicating general associations between religious involvement, and helpful and altruistic behaviour. Although earlier work gave a rather unclear picture, as research methodologies have improved, we can conclude with more confidence that the links between religion and altruistic behaviour are genuinely causal. Religions can and do promote altruistic behaviour by encouraging the study and socialization and practice of values including altruism. Altruism is linked to feelings of self-worth, purpose, spirituality and religious identity.

Summary and conclusions

This review has indicated the importance of altruism as a core value and ideal in religious teachings, embedded in a network of beliefs about spirituality, soteriology, and purpose in life. Social scientific concern with altruism, identified and initiated by Weber, has explored  definitions and explanations for helping, prosocial and altruistic behaviour. The role of religion in promoting altruistic values and behaviour has been a longstanding concern. Although early research offered a rather muddled picture of the role of religion in promoting altruism, research since the 1980s has indicated more clearly that religion is likely to play a causal role in promoting altruism. Across a range of religious traditions, religious teachings, and role models are the likely routes by which these effects are achieved.