Religious fundamentalism in terrorist violence

This paper examines the social-psychological factors often implicated in discussions of terrorist violence/martyrdom, with a particular focus on the role of religion. We offer a brief description of the psychological theories underpinning terrorist research before focussing on the social-psychological factors often implicated in discussions of terrorist violence and martyrdom.  The roles of psychopathology, irrationality and grievance/threat are examined, followed by empirical research on the beliefs which have been associated with the perpetration and support of terrorist violence, and the social factors which foster those beliefs, including social identity, socially-carried interpretations, group leadership, and individual differences.  Although religion is not a single, simple causal factor in terrorist violence, religious elements often feature strongly in the belief systems associated with terrorist violence, and can also feature in other important fostering factors for terrorist violence, such as the use of rhetoric. Finally, the status of lay explanations of terrorist violence, focussing on the role of religious fundamentalism are examined.  

Address correspondence to: M. Brooke Rogers, King’s College London University

“If we can determine what drives people to commit such heinous crimes, it is suggested, perhaps we can change their behaviour.  Or, if their grievances really are just, perhaps we can change ours” (Von Hippel, 2002, p. 25).

The 2001 terrorist attacks on the World Trade Centre in New York City on September 11^th prompted an intense examination of the level of terrorist threat and activity around the world.  As a result, the existing knowledge and resources that governments have to combat or counter terrorist activity came under the spotlight (Danieli, Brom and Sills, 2005; Taylor & Horgan, 2006).  

The incidents of 9/11 signalled a step-change in the world of terrorist research, as well as in the public mind.  Moreover, it was deemed no longer acceptable for such a significant global concern to be so lacking in long-term academic investment, sterile and underdeveloped psychological approaches, and theories unsupported by empirical research (Danieli et al., 2005; Taylor & Horgan, 2006).  Instead, government bodies and research programmes were tasked with the development of comprehensive, flexible psychological theories capable of explaining terrorist behaviour in a variety of different cultures and settings.  Additionally, the importance of engaging the public in an examination of the international drivers of terrorism came to the fore.  As the phrase, ‘The War on Terror’, entered into western political dialogues, the need to address the consequences of terrorist violence through mediums other than the nightly news became a reality.

In the following discussion, we examine a number of psychological explanations of terrorism, with a particular focus on the role of religious factors. 

Unpacking the Terrorism Toolbox

One group’s terrorist is another group’s martyr. 

This observation highlights a salient aspect of the phenomena that will be explored in this paper. Individuals prepared to die for a cause view themselves, and are viewed by their group, as fulfilling their sacred obligation.  However, those outside of their group see them as fundamentalists or fanatics.

What is terrorism? Jongman (2005) and others have pointed to the large range of definitions and types of terrorism. Jongman offers a provisional definition, that terrorism targets random or symbolic victims from a target group, with the aim of forcing a perceived enemy into submission by creating a credible threat of violence. This, in turn, puts other members of the target group into a state of chronic terror. 

A number of psychological approaches have been used to develop a better understanding of terrorism, including the psychoanalytic, cognitive and social approaches, among others.  It is important to keep in mind that all of these approaches interact and inform one another, but they are clearly built upon a few unique cornerstones.  

Terrorism as Psychopathology.

The attempt to identify a terrorist personality or disorder to explain terrorist behaviour has led many researchers to conclude that terrorists are often psychologically healthier and more stable than the rest of the criminal population, or at least not more likely to display signs of ‘appreciable psychopathology’ than other people (Rasch, 1979; Crenshaw, 1981; Silke, 1998; Crenshaw, 2000; Lanning, 2002; Ruby, 2002; Atran, 2003; Whittaker, 2003; Ganor, 2005; Silke, 2006).  Ganor suggests that, while the actions of a terrorist (e.g. murder, sabotage, blackmail) might be identical to the behaviour of a common criminal, terrorists differ because their behaviour is motivated by a wider goal, such as ideological, religious, social or economic changes.   Moreover, Silke (1998) highlights the difficulties in creating a strong theoretical base in this area, as the reliance on second-hand sources creates a situation where the researchers and ‘experts’ who suggest that terrorists are psychologically abnormal tend to be the ones with the least amount of contact with actual terrorists.  

In the past, searches for possible psychopathology among terrorists have not been altogether systematic.  Steven (2006) examined data from interviews examining the motivations for joining terrorist groups, committing acts, and remaining in or leaving the groups.  Steven concurs with others about the overriding importance of the groups’ aims: legitimising their cause, maintaining funding, support and recruitment. Within this context, members show normal and rational characteristics, although some members do show ‘irrational’ and psychopathological characteristics. Johnson and Feldman (1992) agreed that group aims include the promotion of identity and cohesion, and suggested that there might be a degree of self or narcissistic pathology in some members, and that narcissistically vulnerable personalities might be attracted to terrorist group membership. In the latter part of this discussion, the theory that high levels of extrinsic religiosity might be a feature of terrorist group membership will be explored. This is of course highly speculative, but in this context, it interesting to note that extrinsic religiosity has been shown to correlate with several indices of poor mental health and minor psychopathology (Batson, Schoenrade & Ventis, 1993).  

Lanning (2002) suggests that, “if the psychodynamic approach is to help us understand the psychology of terror, it will do so not by showing how terrorists are different from us, but how they are the same” (p. 29).  Thus far, scientific and social scientific interest in the personality and psychopathology of terrorist group members has not been sufficiently strong to generate the kind of systematic examinations that are needed to resolve the question whether particular psychopathologies or disorders are more likely among terrorist group members. Moreover, interest in personality and individual factors has given way to a focus on group processes.

The Cognitive Approach – Terrorism as Irrationality:

“Terrorism is often the last choice in a sequence of choices” (Crenshaw, 1998, p. 11).  

The fact that terrorist activity often follows hot on the heels of the failure of other methods leads some researchers to ask, “Do terrorists have a choice?”  The cognitive approach to understanding terrorism incorporates a number of theories, such as Rational Choice Theory, which purports that if we can understand that the response to the environment as rational, we will then understand the reasons behind the behaviour and motives of an individual.   In short, terrorist behaviour can be seen as a result of wilful choice selected from a number of alternative behaviours (Crenshaw, 1998a).  Issues such as violence stemming from anger, and terrorism as an expression of strategy lead researchers such as Crenshaw (1998a) to suggest that terrorism follows a logical process, which can be discovered and explained.  When trying to uncover how seemingly ‘normal’ individuals can commit terrorist acts, the cognitive approach to understanding terrorism suggests that terrorist behaviour can be rationalised through: 1) Moral justification; 2) Displacement of responsibility; 3) Disregard for the consequences; 4) Dehumanisation; and 4) Attribution of blame (Bandura, 1998). In short, “The use of violent behaviour by terrorist groups is seen as a wilful choice made by an organisation for political and strategic reasons, rather than as the unintended outcome of psychological or social factors” (Reich, 1998, p. 7-8).  However, in terms of individual participation in terrorist activity, Rational Choice Theory fails to support the concept of logical individuals undertaking terrorist activity as a result of political and strategic movements.  This is because terrorism, as a form of political strategy, has its roots in the concepts of collective rationality, as well as the collective preferences and values of a group.  The high cost of terrorist activity (i.e. death, injury, capture) cancels out the benefits of the behaviour (i.e. political or social change), suggesting that a rational person would not take part in terrorist behaviour unless the benefits are also psychological (Crenshaw, 1998b; Post, 1998).  

What kind of rationale informs terrorist behaviour?  Terrorism involves beliefs about the rightness, justice and sanctity of ones cause. It might involve beliefs that are counterfactual, or pairs or sets of beliefs that cannot all simultaneously be true, for example that the destruction of the Twin Towers in New York represents a triumph for Islam against the corrupt Western world, and that the destruction of the Twin Towers was actually engineered by the Israeli Mossad. This poses the problem of  how seemingly religious individuals and organisations support and even take credit for acts of violence and destruction?  An analysis of terrorist rhetoric might help to explain this apparent conflict of action, belief and behaviour.   

Post (1998) approaches the ‘rational terrorist’ argument from a different perspective.  Blaming psychological forces, he does not believe that terrorists resort to violence as a will-full choice.  Instead, the choice appears rationale to the terrorist individual because a form of ‘psycho-logic’ is constructed to rationalise the violent acts.  Psycho-logic has its roots firmly in the arguments of cognitive dissonance of Festinger and Carlsmith (1959), as well as Lerner’s (1980) findings about the prevalence of the ‘just world’ hypothesis, which offers another set of examples of unpleasant and irrational beliefs that are widely prevalent and culturally universal – ‘just world’ beliefs lead to the idea that those who are unfortunate and suffering are somehow less worthy than those who are fortunate and prosperous. Lerner has pointed out that most people will deny thinking in this way, but will still be prone to it, and has offered a number of powerful and convincing demonstrations.  Terrorist psycho-logic combines the psychological tendencies of terrorist group members and terrorist group rhetoric in order to justify violent acts.  Post (1998) claims that this special logic is grounded in the individual’s psychology and reflected in terrorist rhetoric.  

Despite the diverse nature of terrorist group causes, research suggests that the uniformity of their polarizing and absolutist rhetoric is striking (Post, 1998; Rapoport, 1998; Whittaker, 2003)).  As a result, terrorist dialogues contain strong elements of ‘us vs. them’, where the group defines ‘us’ as freedom fighters, fighting for a just cause, and ‘them’ as the source of all evil.  Therefore, it is only logical that the destruction of ‘them’ becomes a moral obligation because, “…if ‘they’ are the source of our problems, it follows ineluctably, in the special psycho-logic of terrorists, that ‘they’ must be destroyed” (Post, 1998, p. 25).   Little evidence exists to suggest that terrorist groups borrow from one another.  Instead, rhetoric and objectives within terrorist organisation from a specific religious group are likely to show similarities in rhetoric and objectives because they study the same sources, rather than because of communication between groups (Rapoport, 1998).  Drake (1998) adds that differences can be found between groups with dissimilar ideologies, suggesting that ideological differences can lead to differences in the target selection of terrorist groups.  

Ideology can also play a role in shaping terrorist psycho-logic.  Post (1998) offers an example of an instance where ideology can become a type of scripture for the group’s morality.  In this case, a member might question the plan to bomb a major department store and accept the argument that anyone willing to shop in such an opulent store is a capitalist consumer, rather than an innocent victim.  Post cautions that, while this represents a course of logical thought, it is important to remember that there isn’t necessarily a relationship between emotional health and logic (e.g. the well-organised paranoid mind).  

Overall, the evidence suggests that terrorists are rational, psychologically healthy individuals.  Despite this, there has been no agreed definition of irrationality, and no systematic examination of this proposal.  However rationality is defined, social psychologists argue that human thinking and reasoning lacks it: beliefs, attitudes and behaviour are subject to biases, driven by self-serving motives, counterfactual, often unjust, unfounded in honest or systematic scrutiny, and illogical. While it might be difficult to show that terrorists are any more irrational than other groups, the authors believe that, at the very least, careful definition of “rationality” is needed.

The Social Approach: The Role of the Group:

It is possible that group membership and identity have a greater influence over terrorist behaviour than individual psychopathology or beliefs. Rather than purely focussing on the individual psychological drivers that lead an individual to terrorist behaviour, the social psychological approach to understanding terrorism explores the influence of group processes and questions why terrorism is attractive to some organisations but unattractive to others with similar grievances.  Researchers in this area focus on which terrorist groups are the most likely to use these extreme methods and why.  The social approach is especially important in understanding suicide terrorism, or martyrdom, because the majority of terrorist organizations are reluctant to lose members through the use of those attacks.  Organisations willing and capable of operating on that level are the most dangerous and lethal (Crenshaw, 1998b; Post, 1998; Silke, 2003).  The authors propose that unpacking terrorism at this level is a primary objective, as groups are easier to identify than individuals.  Identifying the groups likely to resort to suicide tactics will provide access to the individuals who might take part in such behaviour, a point at which the more individualistic theories can be applied.    

A Role in the Community?

Silke (2006) proposes that no matter how successful a terrorist group appears to be, even the larger and more popular terrorist groups represent a minority within their communities, despite the fact that these communities share in events such as long-suffering oppression, possible attempts at genocide, and more.  In some communities terrorists are largely tolerated, but the number of individuals actively involved in violence remains relatively low.  This leads to the question of what then does drive individuals to take action in the form of terrorism, from a community that shares many of the same experiences?  In order to answer this question, researchers have attempted to identify the underlying social and organizational drivers influencing the likelihood that an individual will undertake terrorist behavior.  

Grievance and Threat:

Before delving into an analysis of the organisational group structures, it is important to define the types of grievance and threat terrorists and their communities have experienced.  Terrorism has assumed many forms, but all appear to be driven by a sense of grievance – for example that land essential to identity is occupied by others or threat – or rights and privileges are threatened.  Using the term ‘concrete grievances’ Kushner (1996) notes that potential bombers have almost always had at least one friend or relative killed, maimed or abused by the perceived enemy.  This supports Silke’s (2006) claim that the transition from being a member of a disaffected group to a violent extremist is usually facilitated by a catalyst event.  A clear list of social drivers emerges, including the loss of parents or loved ones (fragmented families), severe conflict, especially with parents, and the existence of a criminal record (Post, 1998).  Shared attributes include personality characteristics such as action-orientation, increased levels of aggressiveness and excitement seeking (Silke, 2003).  Additionally, splitting and externalisation appear to occur more frequently in members of terrorist groups, but not with enough frequency to enable psychologists to create a firm ‘terrorist profile’ (Silke, 2003; Whittaker, 2003).   

Interestingly, splitting and externalisation, which entails breaking the personality into ‘me’ and ‘not me’ to an extent that the good and bad parts of an individual cannot be integrated (e.g. all positive traits equate with ‘me’, while all negative traits equate with ‘not me’ or are projected onto someone else) are characteristics commonly seen individuals who have had their personality development impacted by damage or stress during childhood.  In turn, these tendencies contribute to an image of an injured self, or narcissistic wounds (Post, 1998).  One of the most interesting examples of this trend can be found in Clarke’s (1983) description of those members of ETA (Euzkadi Ta Akatasuma: Basque Fatherland and Liberty Movement) who are of mixed Basque-Spanish origin, and thus despised and seen as half-breeds.  Despite this, they make up 40% of ETA, which led Clarke (1983) to conclude that it is possible that the members of mixed-race are trying to authenticate themselves through acts of terrorism…also known as ‘out-Basquing the Basques’ (Reich, 1998, pp. 29).  

Silke (2006) suggested that any given society will contain some minorities or disaffected groups who (rightly or wrongly) believe that the world has treated them badly.  When an individual identifies with these groups, they begin to share in the sense of injustice, which can then combine itself with a sense of belonging or association to the group in question.  Add a catalyst event in the form of extreme violence against the individual or those the individual holds dear, and the path to terrorist group membership has been laid out.   

Other issues impacting the likelihood of membership of a terrorist group include a pre-existing cultural acceptance or precedence for self-sacrifice or martyrdom in conflict, the existence of a long-term or long-running conflict involving multiple casualties on both sides, and the fact that the protagonists do not believe that victory is within their reach (Silke, 2006).  Additionally, the role of poverty is cited as one of the key social drivers of terrorism.  Despite this popularly held belief, Von Hippel (2002) states, “Common sense would dictate that there is a direct correlation between poverty and terrorism, yet the evidence gathered thus far does not lend credence to this proposition and, if anything, supports the opposite” (p. 26).  Pape (2003, 2005) offers support with his findings that countries encountering suicide terrorist attacks between 1980 and 2001 tend to be ‘middle income societies’.  Far from being the poorest countries in the world, general life expectancies in these countries were very close to those of the United States (Pape, 2005; Moghadam, 2006).  

Despite the importance of the role of grievance and threat in determining the likelihood of membership in a terrorist organisation, the authors believe that grievance and threat in themselves are insufficient as causes, since other solutions to the problems underlying grievance may be possible. It has been suggested that terrorism and other violent solutions are adopted when other solutions are perceived to be ineffective. We still do not understand well enough the processes leading to the decisions to adopt violent solutions, in order to propose effective preventive measures.

The Power of the Group:

The exploration of group processes may be a more helpful way forward in understanding the role of religious and other factors in terrorist violence.  A discussion of terrorist group dynamics cannot take place without first grounding the group interactions in the social psychology of ethnocentrism and intergroup conflict.  

Sumner (1906) defined ethnocentrism as, “The view of things in which one’s own group is at the centre of everything, and all others are scaled or rated with reference to it” (p. 13).  This can include a number of biases, including preference for in-group characteristics, products, customs, languages, speech styles, and others.  When one group is biased   towards another, this can lead to intergroup conflict.  In order for intergroup conflict to exist, a number of conditions must be met.  First, there must be at least two identifiable social categories (e.g. Serb/Croat; Catholic/Protestant) in existence.  Second, members of a group should not have a lot of variability within their beliefs and behaviours.  Finally, the treatment of the ‘other’ group must be uniform (e.g. they are all alike).  Importantly, the competition for resources is known to increase intergroup conflict (Sherif, 1966; Hewstone & Cairns, 2001).  In terms of terrorist groups, a theory known as Realistic Group Conflict Theory (Brewer, 1979; LeVine & Campbell, 1972; Sherif, 1966) can be applied.  This theory purports that conflicts between groups are rationale and logical because the groups are competing for resources, and thus have incompatible goals.  The fact that the groups are competing for scarce resources means that the conflict is realistic.  Other research shows that, sometimes, simply knowing that the other (‘different’) group exists is enough to trigger intergroup discrimination (Sherif, 1966; Hewstone & Cairns, 2001).  

Social Identity Theory (SIT: Tajfel & Turner, 1979) underpins these interactions, with individuals creating a positive identity by defining themselves in terms of their group membership, which enables them to assign value and emotional significance to their group membership and group goals. Self-definition as a group member brings with it a tendency to see one’s own group as better than relevant comparison others, and to rally to its defence when it is perceived to be threatened (Branscombe, Ellemers, Spears & Doosje, 1999). The latter may be an important way in which social identity links to terrorism – when a valued social identity is perceived to be under threat from another group (e.g. when Islam is perceived to be under threat from ‘the West’) then those who identify strongly will tend to derogate and hold negative views towards the group posing the threat. Because the social identity becomes a part of the self-concept, then a threat to the group is a threat to self. 

When individuals behave in a group setting, the social forces in the group have a strong influence on their judgement and behaviour (e.g. conformity). Social psychologists use these theories and dynamics to investigate the extent to which a group can influence an individual, as well as the extent to which an individual can shape a group (Bion, 1961; Hewstone & Cairns, 2001).  With respect to terrorist group membership, belonging to such a group might be the first time that a terrorist individual feels accepted, important, or needed.   The perception of external danger serves to magnify group cohesion in terrorist organisations, which in turn reduces internal disagreements as the group tries to create a united front against an external threat.  Research suggests that, occasionally, this perceived threat is the only thing holding the terrorist group together (Post, 1998).  Additionally, perceived time-pressure (i.e. urgency), danger and mistrust of outsiders can together lead to ‘groupthink’ (Janis, 1982) whereby decision-making may become irrational and members of the group fearful of appearing not to hold the majority view.

Membership in any group comes with both benefits and pressure, which impact the attitudes and behaviours of the individuals who make up the group.  In terrorist groups, these forces can put pressure on an individual to conform.  Post (1998) also identified the additional pressure to commit acts of violence for members of terrorist groups.  He believes that, oddly, membership in some terrorist groups forms a paradox where the group’s ideology is strongly anti-authority, yet the group operates in such an authoritarian manner that the only acceptable way to rid the group of doubt is to rid the group of doubters.  Withdrawal becomes impossible, ‘except by way of the graveyard’ (p. 33).  

Pressure to commit acts of violence aids the process in which an individual socialised to one set of socially acceptable moral codes can progress into a situation where the group moral codes replace their individual moral codes, enabling them to commit acts of violence.  In this case, terrorist groups must commit violent acts in order to reaffirm the group identity and justify the existence of the group. As Post (1998) put it, “What are freedom fighters if they don’t fight?” (p. 36).  This then creates a dynamic where terrorist groups have been accused of sabotaging their chances at success.  This is due to the fact that the highest priority for a terrorist group is the survival of the group.  If they succeed, or all of their demands are granted, the group no longer has a reason to exist unless it changes its goals.  Therefore, terrorist group goals are absolutist, as reflected in their associated rhetoric and ideology.  The decision of many countries and government not to bargain or deal with terrorists is supported by this case, as nothing less that total victory will fulfil the absolutist goals, which will then have to be altered in order to ensure survival of the organisation (Drake, 1998; Post, 1998; Whittaker, 2003).   

Religion and Terrorist Violence

Individuals from many religious groups have been willing to die for their cause.  Despite this, researchers repeatedly conclude that religion is rarely the root cause of suicide terrorism (Moghadam, 2006; Pape, 2003; 2005; Rogers, 2006; Silke, 2006, etc.), suggesting that the ‘religious framework’ offers the excuse, and the terrorist framework offers the means s to carry out the job.  Religion might appear to play an elevated role because of the rhetoric used by terrorist groups, but the key factors driving the choice of suicide bombers appear to be low self-esteem combined with concrete grievances.  Membership in a terrorist group fulfils the self-esteem needs of an individual, while providing the necessary training and outlet for the emotions caused by concrete grievances, yet these act as facilitative forces, rather than the driving force behind suicide terrorism or martyrdom (Post, 1998).  

Fundamentalism

In the wake of the attacks on the Twin Towers and other targets in the USA, on 9^th September2001, the British Prime Minister Tony Blair was concerned to maintain a peaceful pluralist society in Britain.  He wished to defuse the atmosphere of anti-Islamic feeling in the UK, and to diminish the number of racist-religious attacks on Muslims, and on those mistakenly believed to be Muslims, as well as Mosques.  He offered the suggestion that the perpetrators of terrorist attacks were fundamentalists, whereas other, peaceful good citizens were not. Gummer and Loewenthal (2006) and Lewis, Mullan and Quigley (2006) found that this distinction was also made by British people. Fundamentalism was distinguished from “true religion”. Here is what some of the British people interviewed in Gummer and Loewenthal (2006) said:

“It’s a bigoted form of religion that they’ve made up themselves”

“…fundamentalists…they believed they were doing it for their religion, but I don’t think this is true…most religions are peaceful…deviant from the laws of the religion and taken it too far”.

“It is obviously based around their version of Islam, which I don’t think is Islam”.

The suggestion that terrorists hold fundamentalist views could be empirically tested, in principle.  Fundamentalism could be assessed in terrorists/freedom fighters, or those who would consider joining such a group, and in other research participants. There would be difficulties in doing such research.  First, in identifying and recruiting appropriate participants.  Terrorists are not easy for researchers to access.  Second, are there suitable measures of fundamentalism, and are they culturally appropriate?  No-one has managed to do this kind of research so we cannot be sure whether there is any grain of truth in the proposal that terrorists are fundamentalists, compared to other people.

There are however related pieces of theory and research that mean we should not dismiss the idea too rapidly.

In 1950, Adorno, Frenkel-Brunsik, Levinson and Sanford published “The Authoritarian Personality”, a study which explored the tendency towards fascist, un-humanitarian beliefs in a liberal democratic society. They showed that a number of social attitudes tended to co-occur: ethnocentrism, political and economic conservatism and anti-Semitism. Moreover, this ideological package tended to be held by individuals who were assessed high on the F Scale – a measure of personality indicating potentiality for fascism, also denoted by the term authoritarian personality.  The F Scale identified nine dimensions of a protofascist personality: conventionality, submissiveness, aggression, subjectivity, superstitiousness, toughness, cynicism, the tendency to project unconscious emotional responses onto the world, and heightened concerns about sex. Items included “No insult to our honor should ever go unpunished" (toughness and aggression), and “No matter how they act on the surface, men are interested in women for only one reason" (sex and cynicism). Adorno et al. showed that authoritarians tended to have been subjected to rigid, inflexible, highly disciplinarian parenting, with often severe physical punishment. The researchers suggested that this caused individuals to disown their undesirable characteristics, and to project these onto socially excluded groups and individuals. They also thought that authoritarianism was associated with forms of religiosity that were not personally integrated, indeed dysfunctional. Aspects of Adorno et al’s sampling and methodology have been criticised (e.g. Smith, 1997) and fundamentalism and prejudice are often carelessly treated as interchangeable terms, but the key findings have held up well (Smith, 1997) and many of Adorno’s key claims still resonate today.

Similar to the polarizing and absolutist rhetoric (us vs. them) used by terrorist groups, Dein (2006) found that exemplary dualism – the belief that we (members) are good and others are evil – is characteristic of many religious groups, though it is not exclusive to religious groups. The sharp distinction between us-good and them-bad (splitting and projection) was suggested by Adorno et al. (1950) to be a feature of the authoritarian personality. It is also strongly marked in racist ideology and religiously-justified bigotry.

Adorno et al.’s suggestions resonated in the 1960s, in the suggestions of Gordon Allport. He and his colleagues were struggling with the paradoxical problems of religion and prejudice. Allport thought that religion could make people more prejudiced – and it could also help to reduce prejudice. This in itself sounds like a feeble catch-all hypothesis, but Allport proposed a way of clarifying the effects. Allport had made major contributions to the study of personality and psychological development, when in 1950 he published The Individual and His Religion.  This book was based on a study of North American adults, many of whom were World War II veterans. Allport was interested in what happened to individual religious beliefs and feelings under serious stress, such as that imposed by combat experiences. Allport distinguished between an immature, self-focussed religiosity, which involved the belief that G-d will take care of the individual, and did not involve strong concerns for others. Under stress, this might evolve into a more mature, less self-centred religiosity, involving more concern for other people. Conversely, stress might also lead to the loss of faith.  In the 1960s Allport developed these ideas in order to resolve the paradoxes of religion and prejudice, for example the repeated finding that in social surveys, religious people tend to be more prejudiced than others. Prejudice can be defined as negative stereotyped views about others, seen as unlike the self and ones own group. 

Allport suggested two orientations towards religion, which he called extrinsic and intrinsic. In 1966 he suggested that extrinsic religiosity “is strictly utilitarian: useful for the self in granting safety, social standing, solace, and endorsement for one’s chosen way of life” (p. 455). The intrinsically religious individual regards faith as a supreme value in its own right, filling life with motivations and meaning, not limited to self-interest. Allport and Ross (1967) proposed that that those high on extrinsic religiosity would be more prejudiced than those low on extrinsic religiosity, while intrinsic religiosity would be associated with low prejudice. They developed measures of intrinsic and extrinsic religiosity which have been refined by later researchers, and further, related measures have been added, including measures of fundamentalism. Allport’s suggestions attracted great interest, and some criticism. But his basic suggestion – that styles of religiosity might relate to other social attitudes in general and prejudice in particular – has been broadly confirmed by much subsequent research (Batson, Schoenrade & Ventis, 1993; Francis, in press). 

Hood, Hill and Williamson (2002) reflect current disillusion with personality as a useful explanatory factor.  They see fundamentalism as a search for meaning, in which sacred texts are particularly important as a source of supreme authority, offering a meaning system and a guide to normative behaviour.  They conclude that fundamentalism has become a ‘theological swear-wor’”, often confused with bigotry and other unpleasant traits.  Early research indicated weak or no empirical support for a relationship between fundamentalism and authoritarianism/dogmatism.  However, later widespread use of Altemeyer’s context-free measure of right-wing authoritarianism does indicate a relationship between fundamentalism and prejudice (e.g. Altemeyer & Hunsberger, 1992). There is recurrent difficulty in distinguishing between content and style in belief: the proposed psychodynamics of prejudice and authoritarianism are not easy to capture in measures of beliefs and attitudes. Interestingly, Hood et al’s work does not examine childhood experience as a possible determining factor in styles of belief, fundamentalism and prejudice, which contradicts the research on catalyst events and concrete grievances mentioned earlier in this discussion.  Streib, (2002) however, does consider this possibility. In discussing the developmental aspects of fundamentalism, he suggests that interpersonal relations and their psychodynamics both indicate and promote religious development.  Based on suggestions of Fowler (2001), Loevinger (1976) and others, Streib (2002) offers a religious styles model.  In this model, fundamentalism is seen as the prevalence or revival of literal understanding, of anxiety towards a taskmaster deity. 

Although other aspects of religion have been considered in relation to terrorism (McTernan, 2003, and elsewhere in this article), fundamentalism remains a poorly-understood but intriguing possible contributory factor.

Conclusions:

As Reich so aptly stated, “No single psychological theory, and no single field of scholarly study” can completely explain the motivations of terrorist individuals and groups (p.1).  The authors would like to add their support to this statement, while suggesting that the links between research into issues such as psychopathology, terrorist psych-logic and rhetoric, concrete grievances, and the pressures and benefits of terrorist group membership, link with a number of social psychological theories that might offer insight into the ill-supported link that just will not go away: the role of religious fundamentalism in terrorism.  

This overview of work on how social and psychological factors, including early upbringing, might result in prejudice and extrinsic religiosity has initiated tempting ideas relating to fundamentalism and susceptibility to terrorist activity, but the ideas are highly speculative.  Religious fundamentalism, however defined, is unlikely to be a single cause of terrorism, but it may often reflect other aspects of between-group, within-group and personal dynamics that may be causal factors in terrorism.  Rogers (2006) goes so far as to suggest that the repeated focus on religion is often an excuse to avoid focussing on the real social issues, including the growing gap between groups of varying socio-economic status.   

It is possible to suggest a constellation of extrinsic religiosity, authoritarianism and prejudice, and early experiences of punishment play a role in influencing the likelihood of participation in terrorist groups and terrorist activity – but to date no-one has attempted to link these social psychological theories on personality, prejudice and fundamentalism to terrorist research.  Even if this research were to be done, further important questions still need to be answered. Firstly, are terrorists indeed more prejudiced than others? It is reasonable to propose that hostile stereotyped views of others (prejudice) might be held by those who committed to their harm, but this suggestion awaits confirmation. And secondly, it is possible that the understandings gained from the study of prejudice may help to deepen understandings gained from the social identity approach to the understanding of inter-group hostility described earlier in this article. Finally, satisfactory definitions of fundamentalism need to be arrived at and the relations between fundamentalism and the personality and attitude factors explored more precisely.