Terrorism & Martyrdom seminars (proceedings)

From the President’s list of issues to be addressed, I would like to ask what we know about the causes of terrorism, and the causes of fundamentalism. I will do this from the perspective of a psychologist involved in work on religious issues in relation to mental health.

I would like to start by considering some of the media messages about the 11 September perpetrators. The ones that seemed salient to me were:

They are martyrs to the Islamic cause;

They are terrorists;

They are enemies of democracy;

They are fundamentalists;

They are not psychologically disturbed; 

Most Muslims are not fundamentalists.

Both media and politicians were disseminating the belief that fundamentalism is a cause of terrorism. Is it?

I could try to answer this by asking what evidence there is. The simplest kind of evidence would involve assessing fundamentalism, and seeing if it is, empirically,  associated with “terrorism”. The definition and measurement of both are – of course- difficult. I shall look at the question of the definition and measurement of fundamentalism and terrorism, and ask – not only whether they are associated with each other, but what each is associated with. What do we know about their possible causes?

Several methods have been suggested for measuring fundamentalism, for example self-identification (as a fundamentalist), content of beliefs, and membership of a fundamentalist group or sect. Note that religious fundamentalist beliefs were found by Altermeyer & Hunsberger (1992) to be present to an equal extent in “non-fundamentalist” and “fundamentalist” religious groups. Thus, in this particular study, two of these methods of measurement did not cross-validate each other, an embarrassing fate for any psychometric measure.

Fundamentalism, as assessed by psychologists, does have some “construct” validity – it is associated with some of the psychological traits and qualities that one might expect: including non-quest religiosity (Altemeyer & Hunsberger, 1992), authoritarianism (as defined by Adorno et al, 1950) and extrinsic religiosity (Allport & Ross, 1967; Batson, Schoenrade & Ventis, 1993). But is it more likely in “terrorists”?

Terrorism has been defined as “the use of terror to intimidate, especially as a political weapon or policy”, but as we are all aware, descriptions of particular activities as terrorist can vary. For example, here is the percentage of times a particular activity was described as terrorist, by 20 European newspaper editors: hostage taking 80%; indiscriminate bombing 75%; kidnapping 70%; urban guerilla warfare 65%; 

sabotage 60%; torture 45%. 

The most striking variation in views of terrorism was described and defined by Pettigrew (1979) as the ultimate attribution error. “Terrorist” is the other group’s view, my group sees “heroes” and “martyrs”. There has been some empirical, quantified evidence that this reliably happens. Hunter, Stringer & Watson (1991) were able to show this effect among Protestants and Catholics in Northern Ireland, for example, when they looked at video clips of inter-group violence.

So there are real problems with defining a terrorist. But to some extent the problems have not been seen as insurmountable. Notably, Silke (2002) has concluded that terrorists show no noteworthy psychopathology (apart from their damaging behaviour). 

If terrorists are not obviously suffering from psychopathology, what causes or enables the highly risky and damaging behaviour that characterises terrorism? Possible factors could include group inclusion processes, in which beliefs are socialised and come to be regarded as normative. Much work on “minority influence” (Moscovici, 1980) and (religious) group incorporation (Batson et al, 1993) has identified the conditions under which initially bizarre and unacceptable beliefs become acceptable and accepted. Other important factors could include training, obedience and insitutional demands: Milgram (1974) and  Zimbardo(1969) have done much to show how cruel and damaging behaviour can easily develop given an appropriate institutional structure which legitimates abusive behaviour. As is well-known, in Milgram’s work, normally mild-mannered students agreed to administer apparently lethal electric shocks. In Zimbardo’s study, normally mild-mannered students became tyrannical and abusive prison guards, causing such alarm to the investigators,  that the mock prison was abruptly and prematurely closed down for fear of serious damage to the participants. Obedience to orders, the need to maintain discipline, and religious justifications, can all be perceived as compelling reasons for behaviour normally seen as cruel, dangerous or abusive. In Mental Health and Religion, I argued that cruelty and abuse have not generally been regarded as psychopathological, and their origins are not as well understood, perhaps because they are often sanctioned by institutions – including religious institutions – as necessary and even holy (Loewenthal, 1995). 

But are terrorism and fundamentalism associated? We still do not know.

To summarise and conclude: the media and political messages that terrorists are fundamentalists may or may not be true. The definitions of fundamentalism and terrorism are not really satisfactory. The little research that has been done on these topics has not looked at whether the two are associated, or whether fundamentalism is a necessary precondition of terrorism.

Of course it would be helpful to know whether terrorists actually score higher on any of the existing measures of fundamentalism, than do non-terrorists. It would be also be helpful to know more about the group processes and group beliefs supporting the ideas of rightness, martyrdom and heroism.

Finally and more tentatively, given that there is still debate about whether or not terrorists are “disturbed”, and about whether and when bizarre or unusual behaviour, condoned by a religious or other group, is “disturbed”, I would suggest that the College need not foreclose on the issue of whether or not terrorists are “disturbed”: perhaps at least some terrorist behaviour is a matter of psychiatric concern.